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NO CONTROL OVER THEIR RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY: COLLEGE ATHLETES
LEFT SITTING THE BENCH
Kristine Mueller*
INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is the right of every person to control the commercial use of his or
her identity.' There are also personal interests protected by this right.2 The protection is often
said to apply to an individual's persona. A persona encompasses things such as a person's
likeness, nickname3 , performing style or mannerisms4 , and voice imitations.5 An individual's
right of publicity is governed by either common law or by state statutes, as no federal right of
publicity exists.
The right of publicity has been applied in cases involving athletes, but the application of
this right for college athletes has yet to be addressed in a serious manner by the judicial system.
There is little case law on the issue in spite of the serious violations of college athletes' publicity
rights. Student-athletes have virtually no control over the commercial use of their identities.
J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 2004.
J. Thomas McCarthy and Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete's Identity: The Right of Publicity,
Endorsements and Domain Names, II MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195 (2001).
2 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992),which recognized the right of publicity can be used to
protect reputational interests of a celebrity. In Waits, a sound-alike of singer Tom Waits was used in a Doritos
commercial, in spite of the fact that Waits had publicly proclaimed that he did not believe in celebrity commercial
endorsements.
3See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis.2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129, 205 U.S.P.Q. 920 (Wis. 1979), where
action was brought against manufacturer for unauthorized use of professional football player's nickname
"Crazylegs" on a shaving gel.
4 See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.),
involving an action for misappropriation of Guy Lombardo's public personality. He was known as Mr. New Year's
Eve, and the defendant aired an advertisement that simulated the gestures, musical beat and his performance of
"Auld Lang Syne".
See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) where performer, Bette Midler, sued automobile
manufacturer and advertising agency based on advertising that used sound alike in commercial.
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They cannot, themselves, enter into agreements for endorsements or the like, but the universities
they play for are able to enter into endorsement agreements and other contracts for the
commercial uses of the players' identities. Ultimately, the student-athletes sign over their rights
of publicity, in a sense, to the universities.
Under the regulations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), athletes
are not allowed to receive compensation for the commercial use of their personas and likenesses.
These regulations result in the exploitation of the likenesses of college athletes in areas such as
university trading cards, sales of a player's jersey, or the use of their likenesses in video games.
This article will begin by discussing the case law involved in developing the right of publicity for
athletes. It will then explore the regulations of the NCAA, and the methods involved in the
exploitation of college athletes. The article will also discuss proposed and attempted solutions
for combating this issue and the problems associated with these proposals.
II. CASE LAw DEVELOPING AN ATHLETE'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
One of the first cases to deal with a claim for infringement of an athlete's identity without
his consent was in 1941, in the case of O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.6 O'Brien was previously a
college football player for Texas Christian University, and during his time as a student-athlete,
permitted the school to include photographs of him in a press kit. After O'Brien began to play
professional football for the Philadelphia Eagles, Pabst Sales Company gained access to the press
kit, and without O'Brien's permission, printed a calendar, which included his photograph on the
cover, beer slogans, and photos of bottles of beer. O'Brien was involved in a group which
71
' 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
attempted to deter teens from drinking, and argued he would never endorse a beer product, and
such an endorsement without his consent violated his right of publicity. The court dismissed his
claim, holding that if he did not object to the publicity he received from sports pages, he could
not object to the publicity he received from advertising for Pabst beer.
The Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.7 first
recognized an athlete did have a legal claim for the uncompensated use of his identity. In
Haelan, the plaintiff had a contract with a baseball player to use his photograph in connection
with the sale of plaintiff s gum. The player also agreed not to grant any other gum manufacturer
a similar right during the contract term.9 The defendant, aware of the contract between the
plaintiff and the baseball player, induced the player to also enter into a contract to use the
player's photograph in connection with the sale of defendant's gum.10 Defendant contended that
the plaintiffs contracts created nothing more than a release of liability because a man has no
legal interest in the publication of his picture beyond a right of privacy." The Court in Haelan
disagreed with this contention recognizing that, in addition to an independent right of privacy, "a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph."12
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. also recognized that an athlete has a right to control the distribution of
his likeness.13 Ali involved an action brought by former heavyweight champion, Muhammad
Ali, for injunctive relief and damages for the unauthorized printing and distribution of an




" Id. at 868.
12 Id. at 868. The court dubs this right a "right of publicity" and recognizes both economic and moral harms can arise
from misappropriation of one's likeness.
" 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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objectionable portrait of Ali in Playgirl Magazine.14 The portrait consisted of a nude black man
seated in the corner of a boxing ring and was claimed to be unmistakably recognizable as Ali.15
The court examined the facts to determine if a preliminary injunction is appropriate.' 6 When
examining the success of Ali's claim on its merits, the Court addressed one defense given by the
Defendants. The Defendants argued that the statutory right of privacy does not extend to protect
Ali, as he is an "athlete, who chooses to bring himself to public notice, who chooses, indeed . .
.to rather stridently seek out publicity."' 7 The Court rejected this argument and stated that "such
a contention confuses the fact that projection into the public arena may make for newsworthiness
of one's activities, and all the hazards of publicity thus entailed, with the quite different and
independent right to have one's personality, even if newsworthy, free from commercial
exploitation at the hands of another." 8 The Court held that, in light of the foregoing, there was a
likelihood that Ali would prevail on both his statutory claim and his common law right of
publicity.19
These are some of the first cases to recognize a right of publicity, and additionally apply
this right to an athlete. The majority of cases, though, have addressed this right of publicity only
in regard to professional athletes.20 There are certainly fewer cases, if any, extending a right of
14 Id at 725. Ali's claim was brought under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Act and his related common
law right of publicity.
15 Id at 725.
16 Id. at 726. The Court states that a preliminary injunction should be issued only upon a clear showing of either (1)
probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party
requesting the preliminary relief.
17 Id at 727.
8 Id. at 727, citing Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y.A.D. 1962).
19 Ali, at 728. The Court went on to examine if there was irreparable injury and ultimately granted Ali a preliminary
injunction.
20 Fleer Corp v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1981); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.Supp.
1277 (Minn. 1970); Baltimore Orioles Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.
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publicity to college athletes. The reason for this may be due to the restrictions placed on college
athletes by the NCAA, which will be discussed later in this article.
One case that did address the right of a college athlete to control the commercial use of
his identity was Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.21 Jeremy Bloom was a
young athlete that had obtained a scholarship to play football at the University of Colorado, but
also was involved in competitive skiing at the Olympic level and had earned the U.S. National
22
and World Cup championship titles in 2002. On top of all this, he also possessed good looks,
which provided him with several modeling and entertainment opportunities, including a contract
with Tommy Hilfiger.23  The NCAA disallowed Bloom to play college football unless he
forfeited his modeling and entertainment opportunities. 24
When Bloom was first offered the scholarship at the University of Colorado, he deferred
his admission to prepare for the 2002 Winter Olympics. 25 After the Olympics, he chose to
pursue his educational and football opportunities at the University, but declined the
scholarship. 26 The University of Colorado filed a waiver in February of 2002, announcing its
support of Bloom's endeavors in skiing and entertainment, but this waiver was denied by the
NCAA. 27  The NCAA bylaws allow college athletes to play professional sports, such as minor-
league baseball, during the summer, and then return to their sports in the fall or spring, as long as
1986); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 280 N.W. 2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
2 No. 02-CV-1249 (20th Dist. Ct. Colo. Aug. 15, 2002).
22 Laura Freedman, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673 (2003).
23 Id at 674.24 id
25 Id. at 678.26 id
27 Id. at 677.
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the only money they accept is salary.28 Skiers competing at the Olympic level do not receive
salaries, though. Instead they receive minimal awards in prize money.29 Therefore, they rely on
compensation from endorsements to fund the expensive training and travel expenses that go
along with participation in the sport. 30 The NCAA bylaw prohibiting college athletes from using
their names and likeness for commercial products restricts athletes, such as Bloom, that are
involved in sports outside of the collegiate level, from pursuing the opportunities presented to
them.
This bylaw of the NCAA also restricted Bloom from participating in his entertainment
and modeling opportunities. He also had been offered a contract to host a show on Nickelodeon,
as well as the contract with Tommy Hilfiger.31 Bloom argued that these endorsements were not
a result of his football ability, but rather a result of his skiing ability, and therefore, he should not
have to forego these opportunities. 32  Bloom went before the District Court of Boulder County
to attempt to obtain an injunction against the NCAA and being forced to choose between playing
football for the University of Colorado and his professional skiing career, and the endorsements
and entertainment opportunities accompanying it.33 The court denied his request for injunctive
relief, recognizing the authority of the NCAA to regulate in this area by holding that the rules
were rationally related to the NCAA's stated purposes of fostering amateurism and were not
28 Freedman, supra note 22, at 679.
29 Freedman, supra note 22, at 680.
30 Freedman, supra note 22, at 680.
Freedman, supra note 22, at 681.
32 Darren Rovell, Judge rules against Bloom in eligibility case, August 17, 2002, available at
http://espn.go.com/ncf/news/2002/0815/1418409.html (last visited July 20, 2004).
33 id.
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arbitrarily applied.34  The Court, though, did express disappointment with the NCAA and
sympathy for Bloom.35
Regardless of the sympathy felt for Bloom, the judge justified the different treatment of
skiers and baseball players on the basis of the differences in salary structure between the
pursuing of a professional career as a skier, as opposed to a baseball player.36 The justification
relied on the fact that, though some athletes would use the sponsorship money to pay for their
athletic endeavors, some would simply take it as profit.37 In response to Bloom's argument that
his modeling and entertainment opportunities were a direct result from his skiing ability, rather
than his ability as a football player, the judge found that the NCAA expressed a reasonable fear
that personal appearances required under Bloom's contract with Tommy Hilfiger could utilize
his football ability, therefore the prohibition on Bloom's continuing under the contract was
rational.38
Bloom chose to play football after the decision of the District Court of Boulder County,
and was forced to pass on some of the lucrative opportunities presented to him.39 Recently,
though, Bloom announced his decision to continue to play football next fall, also while accepting
endorsements for his skiing endeavors. 40 Bloom has continued competing in ski competitions
following the court's decision, but has been doing so at his own expense.41 Bloom intends to
4Freedman, supra note 22, at 683.
Freedman, supra note 22, at 684.
36 Freedman, supra note 22, at 686.
Freedman, supra note 22, at 686.
38 Freedman, supra note 22, at 686.
Freedman, supra note 22, at 687.
40 Sports Illustrated, Deal with it: Bloom to play football, ski, challenge NCAA's endorsement policy, January, 19,
2004, available at http: //sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/football/ncaa/01/19/bc.bloom.sdecision.ap/index.html (last
visited June 6, 2004).
41 id
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force the NCAA to either change its position or prevent him from playing football.42  He
contends that fairness requires the NCAA to control his football career, while the International
Olympic Committee controls his skiing career. 43 The result and action of the NCAA remains to
be seen.
III. NCAA BY-LAWS
The NCAA Constitution and Bylaws form a contract between the NCAA and member
institutions.44  Though student-athletes do no directly enter into the contract, they are still
considered to be parties to the contract.45  The series of bylaws are intended almost solely to
benefit the student athletes, and the amateurism rules are also intended to benefit the student
athletes as to avoid their being exploited.46  Because of the contract's intended benefits to
student-athletes, they are considered to be third-party beneficiaries to the contract. 47
The rules and regulations of the NCAA are based on what is referred to by some
commentators as the amateur/education model. This model views the student-athlete as
embodying the altruistic values of selflessness, devotion, sacrifice, and purity.48 The athletic
scholarship is the form of compensation because it allows the student-athlete to participate in
sports for pure pleasure while also allowing the individual to develop useful skills from his
involvement in the academic program.49
42 [d
43[d
44 Freedman, supra note 22, 689.
45 Freedman, supra note 22, at 690.
46 Freedman, supra note 22, at 690.
47 Freedman, supra note 22, at 690.
48 Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 307 (1998)
49 Id. at 311. The author contends that this model is outdated due to the commercialism present in college athletics
today. Because of this change, the commercial/education model has been introduced. Under this model, college
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Article 12 of the NCAA bylaws details the amateurism requirements of the organization.
Article 12.02.5 defines a student-athlete as a student whose enrollment was solicited by a
member of the athletics staff or other representative of athletics interests with a view toward the
student's ultimate participation in the intercollegiate athletics program. Any other student
becomes a student-athlete only when the student reports for an intercollegiate squad that is under
the jurisdiction of the athletics department. Article 12.1.1 address how a student-athlete can and
must maintain amateur status. An athlete will lose amateur status if he uses his athletic skill,
indirectly or directly, for pay in any form in that sport or receives, directly or indirectly, a salary,
reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports
organization based upon athletics skill or participation.50 Pay is defined as the receipt of funds
not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association not permitted by this article.51
Article 12 also lists several types of pay, which are prohibited. Article 12.1.1.1 prohibits
any direct or indirect salary, gratuity or comparable compensation, any division or split of
surplus (bonuses, game receipts, etc.), excessive or improper awards or benefits, or any cash, or
the equivalent thereof (e.g., trust fund), as an award for participation in competition at any time,
even if such an award is permitted under the rules governing an amateur, non-collegiate event in
which the individual is participating. An award or a cash prize that an individual could not
receive under NCAA legislation may not be forwarded in the individual's name to a different
individual or agency. There are exceptions to prohibitions on payment, such as a student-athlete
may receive awards from the U.S. Olympic Committee pursuant to its Operation Gold Program,
athletics are recognized as a commodity that is marketed, advertised and sold like any other product. This model is
more sympathetic to the possibilities of rewarding college athletes with monetary compensation.
50 This is not an exhaustive list, but rather reflects the restrictions relevant to this article. The complete list is
available in the NCAA Division I Manual, available at http://www.ncaa.org (last visited July 19, 2004).
See NCAA supra note 50, 12.02.2.
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he may receive educational expenses awarded by the Olympic Committee or a prospective
athlete may receive educational expenses prior to collegiate enrollment from any individual or
entity that is not an agent, professional sports team/organization or a representative of an
institution's athletic interests.52 The NCAA does allow players to participate in professional
sports in the summer and return to their college teams in the fall and spring as long as the only
money they accept is from their stated salary.53
The NCAA bylaws also restrict the commercial use of an athlete's name or picture. A
student-athlete's picture may only be used in the advertisement of a commercial product or
service under the following restrictions: if the primary purpose is to publicize the sponsor's
congratulations to the student-athlete or team; if the advertisement does not include the
reproduction of the product with which the business is associated or any other item identifying
the business or service other than its name or trademark; if there is no indication in the makeup
of the advertisement that the squad members, individually or collectively, or the institution,
endorses the product or service; if the student-athlete has not signed a consent or release granting
permission to use his name or picture in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this
section, and if the student has received a prize from a commercial sponsor in conjunction with
participation in the institution's promotional activities and the advertisement involves the
announcement of the receipt of the prize.54  A student-athlete may continue to receive
remuneration for the use of his name or picture in advertising a commercial product or service, if
the athlete was receiving this remuneration prior to enrollment in an institution that is a member
of the NCAA, the athlete became involved in the activities for reasons independent of his athletic
52 See NCAA supra note 50, 12.1.1.1.3.
Freedman, supra note 22, at 679.
54 See NCAA supra note 50, at 12.5.1.4
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ability, no reference is made to his involvement in intercollegiate athletics and the athlete does
not endorse the commercial product.55
Another by-law that may impose restrictions on the ability of college athletes to accept
certain opportunities for commercial use of their identities is By-law 19.8. This by-law provides
that if an athlete that is ineligible to play under the NCAA rules or legislation, but is permitted to
do so by a court order or injunction, and it is later determined that the athlete was improperly
allowed to play, the NCAA may take certain actions against the member institution. One of the
actions that may be taken against is member institution is vacating or striking the team records
and performances achieved during the participation of an ineligible student-athlete. This by-law
prevents member institutions from allowing players that may possibly be declared ineligible to
participate in the sport. Controversial athletes, such as Jeremy Bloom, knowing the reluctance of
universities in allowing them to play, may forego many beneficial opportunities opened up to
them. In contrast, universities may be unwilling to allow the participation of athletes that may
jeopardize a successful team record.
IV. EXPLOITATION OF A COLLEGE ATHLETE'S PERSONA
One of the first areas in which college athletes' rights of publicity were exploited was in
the area of university trading cards. The NCAA does not allow college athletes to receive
compensation more than tuition, room and board. 56 Therefore, a student athlete cannot sell his
likeness commercially and receive compensation for such. Nevertheless, the NCAA does allow
5 See NCAA supra note 50, at 12.5.1.3
5 James S. Thompson, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes Enjoy a Common Law Right to Publicity, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 143 (1994).
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the universities to use a college athlete's likeness commercially.57  Taking advantage of this,
universities began to issue trading cards as a way to raise revenue for their athletic departments.58
In recognizing the potential for commercial exploitation of college athletes, the NCAA passed
several regulations making it impermissible for outside for-profit entities to use the athletes'
likenesses and the trading cards to sell commercial products. 59
These regulations do not completely solve the problem, though. Athletes may still be at
risk of exploitation from the universities themselves. 60 Schools were making a lot of profit from
the trading cards, but yet, the athletes' whose likenesses are generating the sales, were unable to
be compensated for the use of their likenesses under NCAA regulations. 61 An argument can be
made, though, that the college athletes' have indirectly consented to the universities use of their
likenesses.62 By participating in NCAA regulated athletic programs, they agree to abide by the
regulations of the NCAA.63
The NCAA controls the rights to license the sale of college merchandise. 64 The schools
themselves can profit from the sale of this merchandise, but the athletes are limited to accepting
profits in the form of only tuition, fees, room and board and books. 65 The sale of college jerseys
brings to light issues of right of publicity violations. The means of identifying a player is often
by the number on his jersey.66 Because the jersey numbers identify the players, these jerseys are
Id at 167.
5 1Id at 166.59 [d
60 Id at 167.
61 Id
62 Thompson, supra note 56, at 176.
63 Thompson, supra note 56, at 176.
64 Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away With Violating the Right of Publicity, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133 (1996).
65Id. at 134-135.
66 Id. at 145.
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part of their personas.67 The student-athlete's identity and persona are closely connected to the
jersey, as the athlete has made a unique contribution in making that particular jersey number
marketable. 68 A problem may arise in the instance if multiple players have worn the same
number, as it may be difficult to determine which player has rights to the fame behind the
number.
As the right of publicity is intended to prevent the unjust enrichment that occurs by the
universities ability to profit from the control and use of the players' identities, the sale of college
jerseys and the schools reaping the benefits from these sales is an exploitation of the athletes'
identities and their rights of publicity.69 The regulations of the NCAA prevent the student-
athletes themselves from controlling the commercial use of their identities. The proclaimed basis
behind this regulation is to prevent the commercial exploitation of student-athletes. In reality,
the regulation seems to result in a situation it was allegedly designed to prevent.
Again, the defense of implied consent will arise in the instance of publicity violations in
the area of merchandise sales. As the players agree to play for the schools, they consent to the
regulation of the NCAA. Though, countering this argument, it can be argued that the regulations
of the NCAA do not explicitly permit the schools to become unjustly enriched at the expense of
exploiting aspects of a student-athlete's persona. If the athletic team is successful due to the
efforts of the players, it is logical to think that consumers would be content to purchase
merchandise that simply contained the school's logo or name, rather than merchandising a
jersey, which has taken on the identity of the player on the field.
82
67 Id, at 145-146.
68 Idat 148.
69 Id at 147.
The identifying aspect of a student-athlete's jersey is evidenced in the area of video
games. Video game producers have and continue to produce games that provide consumers with
the excitement and intimacy of college sports.70 Universities, which are members of the NCAA
have allowed video game producers to use the schools' fight songs and uniforms.7' These games
depict athletes by their jersey numbers, but allow players to insert names on the jerseys.72 The
argument that the likeness of well-known college athletes' is not used in these games can be
refuted by articles and game reviews of the video games in question. Because of the realistic feel
of the games, these articles and reviews do not refer to the athletes by their numbers, but rather,
by their names. 73  In an article discussing the game, "NCAA Football 98," the following
assertion was made, "If you pick LSU, you'll be coaching the unnamed equivalent of the 1996
[LSU] Tigers, with a No. 3 (Kevin Faulk) as your primary ball carrier and No. 35 (Charles
Smith) anchoring your 4-3 defense at middle linebacker." 74  The issue of right of publicity
violations in the context of video games has been addressed in the professional arena75 , but has
yet to be addressed in the collegiate level.
The NCAA itself may also be responsible for exploiting publicity rights of college-
athletes. The Supreme Court has held that a person possesses a right of publicity in his or her
performance.76 The NCAA entered into a contract with CBS granting the network the exclusive
70 Matthew G. Matzkin, Getting' Played: How the Video Game Industry Violates College Athletes' Rights of
Publicity By Not Paying for Their Likenesses, 21 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 227 (2001).
71 d. at 239.
72 Id. at 240.
73 Id.
74 Matzkin, supra note 70, at 241, citing Scott Rabalais, NCAA and ABC Gain Yardage With Computer College
Football, The Baton Rouge Advoc., Jan. 16, 1998, at Fun 32, available at 1998 WL 2112578.
See Ahn v. Midway Manufacturing Company, 965 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), which held that entire television
broadcast of the performance of human cannonball act without the performer's consent violated his right of
publicity.
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rights to broadcast the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament from 2003 to 2014 in exchange for
$6 billion.77 The student-athletes could possibly have a claim for violation of their rights of
publicity as they did not consent to, nor were compensated for, the broadcast rights of their
performances on the field or on the court. Admittedly, there are concerns that arise with this
argument, as there may be issues of implied consent to the broadcasting as well as issues of
-78copyright preemption.
V. WHY COMPENSATE STUDENT-ATHLETES?
The NCAA allows compensation to student-athletes in the form of a college education,
room and board, books and fees. In comparison to the deals that the NCAA has made with
regard to college athletics, this compensation is small in comparison. For example, take the $6
billion contract between the NCAA and CBS and compare it to the cost of tuition, fees, books
and housing. 79 Does the value of a college education even come close? Some commentators
have made the argument that the education that student-athletes receive is, in fact, no
compensation at all. Often student-athletes are treated differently by professors than the rest of
the student body. For example, during athletes' periods of eligibility, students have often
received a grade of "incomplete."80 The athletes are then allowed to continue participating in
their respective sports. "Once the students' athletic eligibility expired, and the athletes' value to
7 CNNMoney, CBS renews NCAA B'ball, NY, Nov. 18, 1999, available at
http://money.cnn.com/1999/11/18/news/ncaa/ (last visited July 20, 2004).
71 See infra text accompanying note 13.
79 CNNMoney, supra note 77.
8 Larry Elder, The Exploitation of the Student-Athlete, Capitalism Magazine, May, 2000, available at
http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=2327 (last visited July 20, 2004).
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the school disappeared, the 'Incomplete' often reverted to an 'F'."8 1 Professors are found to
give athletes passing grades when not earned by the student or to simply forego giving them a
grade for the purpose of retaining their eligibility.
Commentators have also argued that universities use the Americans with Disabilities Act
to further lead athletes through college by holding their hands along the way.82 According to Dr.
Linda Bensel-Myers, at the University of Tennessee, schools may designate "some student-
athletes as 'at risk,' presumably meaning those likely to struggle academically." 83 These athletes
are then enrolled in what Dr. Bensl-Myers terms "Mickey Mouse" classes, which she seems to
believe are just a cover for making it easier for student-athletes to get by and retain their
academic eligibility to play.84
The graduation rates of student-athletes versus the remaining student body is also
evidence that student-athletes really do not received adequate compensation in the form of a
college education. For students entering college in 1996, participating Division I-A football,
their graduation rate was at 54%, though the overall student body for Division I-A schools
graduated at a rate of 61%.85 The graduation rate for Division I basketball players entering
college in 1996 was only 44% .86 Though looking at NCAA student-athletes across the board, of
those student-athletes entering college in 1996, they graduated at a rate of 62%, which was
higher than the overall student body with a graduation rate of 59%.87 The main focus here
81 Id
82 Id, citing to comments made by Dr. Linda Bensel-Myers, an English teacher at the University of Tennessee.
83 Id.
84 id.
8 The NCAA News, Athlete Graduation rates continue to climb, September 1, 2003, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2003/20030901 /active/4018n01 .html (last visited July 20, 2004).86 id
87 id.
85
remains is on high revenue sports, such as men's football and basketball, as they are the student-
athletes who experience the largest violations of their publicity rights.
In some cases the NCAA regulations prohibiting student-athletes from entering into
commercial deals may themselves hinder the education received by the student-athletes. Take
Jeremy Bloom, for example. He is a communications major at the University of Colorado.88
The NCAA bylaws, though, have prohibited him from partaking of opportunities that may
advance his career as a television broadcaster. Real world experience is encouraged and
considered invaluable experience by the instructors in the broadcasting programming at the
University of Colorado. 89 The NCAA, by prohibiting student-athletes that are studying in the
types of programs that involve television and other commercial or entertainment aspects from
participating in modeling and/or television jobs, also limits the educational opportunities
available to them.
Opponents of allowing additional compensation to student-athletes have argued that an
athletic scholarship is adequate compensation as collegiate level athletics can act as a stage for
scouts from professional leagues such as the NFL or the NBA. 90 The reality though, is most of
these athletes will not make it to professional leagues. This reality creates a problem in the
context of allowing student-athletes to slide by with easy and impractical course just to retain
their eligibility. These student-athletes who believe they will make it to the pros, but in actuality
will not, will be left on the sidelines with a inadequate education and jobless.
88 Freedman, supra note 22, at 682.
89 Freedman, supra note 22, at 682.
90 Thomas Hurst & J. Grier Pressly Ill, Payment ofStudent-Athletes: Legal & Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 55 (2000).
86
So if the alleged compensation of a college education appears so inadequate, then why
not compensate the players for the huge revenues they generate for the schools? If left with little
education and an inability to obtain employment, why not leave a little money in the pockets of
the athletes? One commentator said, "Like millions of fans, I'm more than willing to drink beer
and eat bowls of nachos as I watch college ball. It's great entertainment. Maybe it's time to pay
the entertainers--and not just the schools that exploit them."91 Several commentators have
suggested different formulas and ideas on compensating student-athletes for the exploitations of
their identities and personas by the schools they work so hard for.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR COMPENSATING STUDENT-ATHLETES
A. Creating a Trust
One suggestion put forth is to create a trust for the athletes, which would become
available to them upon graduation. Proponents for student-athlete compensation have suggested
looking to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for guidance. 92 The IOC collects monies
from sources such as endorsement fees and places them into a trust fund, out of which the
athlete's expenses are paid.93 The money is available for withdrawal when the athlete's career
has ended. 94 This suggestion prevents unjustly enriching the universities relying on the celebrity
status of their student-athletes for generating revenues. It allows the athletes to reap the financial
benefits of their labors, while maintaining the focus on amateur athletics. 95 Withholding the
91 Elder, supra note 80, quoting Frank McKissack, a writer for The Progressive.
92 Belo, supra note 64, at 154.
9 Belo, supra note 64.
94 Belo, supra note 64.
95 Belo, supra note 64, at 155.
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income from student-athletes while in school keeps them from being blinded by dollar signs, and
maintains the focus on the task at hand: playing well on the field and getting a quality education.
B. Revenue Sharing
Another proposal for compensating student-athletes is to implement a revenue sharing
program. This proposal would require amended section 12.02.2 of the NCAA Constitution, "so
that student-athletes may receive a portion of revenue generated by their team." 96 Rules 15.2 and
12.1.1 would also need to be amended or repealed in part.97 The revenue sharing system would
involve sharing the net profits generated by a sport, and then distributing in a seniority based
manner.98 For example, a player in his or her fourth year of participation would receive 1% of
the net revenues; a player in his or her third year would receive 0.75% of net revenues; a player
in his or her second year would received 0.5% of the net revenues; and a player in his or her first
year would receive 0.25% of the net revenues generated that year. 99
This revenue sharing system also includes compensation for participation of post-season
tournaments. 100 A suggested distribution is 65% of playoff money goes to the universities, while
the remaining 35% goes to the student-athletes.101 The distribution for post-season revenues
differs from the suggested disbursement of revenues generated during the season in that playoff
96 Acain, supra note 48, at 336. Rule 12.02.2 of the NCAA By-Laws states, "Pay is the receipt of funds, awards or
benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association for participation in athletics," available at
http://www.ncaa.org.
9 Acain, supra note 48, at 337. Rule 12.1.1. states that an athlete will lose his or her amateur status if he or she,
"Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport." Rule 15.2 details acceptable
types of financial aid. The complete text of both Rules is available at http://www.ncaa.org.
98 Acain, supra note 48, at 337.
99 Acain, supra note 48, at 338.
100 Acain, supra note 48, at 338.
101 Acain, supra note 48, at 338.
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money should be distributed based on the player's role and performance in the post-season,
rather than based on the number of years a player has participated.102
An additional aspect of the revenue sharing system allows additional compensation based
on athletic or academic All-American status. Certain newspapers and magazines annually select
All-American teams made up of the best players in both basketball and football.103 Additionally,
certain corporations, such as General Telephone & Electric, sponsor an academic All-American
team, honoring nearly 700 men and women student-athletes.1 04 Currently, the NCAA limits
compensation for All-American status to $300.105 Under the revenue sharing plan, student-
athletes receiving these awards would be allowed greater compensation.106
Revenue sharing also allows for student-athletes to accept endorsements. College
merchandise sales are a booming business, and it is argued that student-athletes should be able to
share in the profits from such sales, as they are often the reason behind the teams' popularity.107
Also, as mentioned previously, compensation to student-athletes for sale of college jerseys is
more so justified as the student-athletes' persona are embodied in the jerseys and their jersey
numbers. 08 There are three forms of suggested endorsement revenue distribution. The first
involves "dividing a portion of all fees collected by university[ies] through licensing
agreements."' 09 The second form involves distributing money obtained for allowing commercial
102 Acain, supra note 48, at 339.
1o3 Acain, supra note 48, at 339.
104 Acain, supra note 48, at 340.
104 Acain, supra note 48, at 339.
1o6 Acain, supra note 48, at 339.
105 Acain, supra note 48, at 341.108 See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
109 Acain, supra note 48, 342.
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sponsorship by product manufacturers of individual teams. 110 The third method of endorsement
distribution would "allow student-athletes to endorse products both nationally and locally.""'
C. Removal of Restriction on Part-Time Employment of Student-Athletes
One attempted solution for inadequate of compensation for student athletes has been to
lift the prohibition on student-athletes holding part-time jobs.112 This solution in reality creates
more problems than it solves. Student-athletes already have schedules that are stretched thin. It
seems unlikely that they will be able to pick up a few hours a week at the local pizzeria, fit in
practice and be able to devote adequate time to their studies.113 Something has to give and it
seems most likely it would be academics. Also, in argument against allowing part-time jobs, is
that it may promote illegal activities. A wealthy booster may slip a student-athlete working as a
server a large tip under the table, which may go easily unreported as part of the student's
salary.114 "By allowing the student-athletes to get jobs, the NCAA has essentially made it easier
for boosters to slip favored athletes extra money.""15
VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NOT COMPENSATING STUDENT-ATHLETES
A. Educational De-Emphasis
Compensating athletes for their athletic performances takes away from the educational
aspects involved with college sports. The issue of publicity rights violations must be viewed in
the context of an educational institution. One criticism of the revenue sharing proposal is that it
110 Acain, supra note 48, at 342.
Acain, supra note 48, at 342.
Acain, supra note 48.
113 Acain, supra note 48, at 316.
114 Acain, supra note 48, at 316.
1i5 Acain, supra note 48, at 316.
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"does not address academic values," which directly conflicts with the purposes of the NCAA.116
Opponents of revenue sharing believe that turning the current system of college athletics into a
professional model will cause many universities to dispose of any obligation they have to afford
student-athletes with a meaningful education." 7  An argument has been made that the
devaluation of a quality education is a greater cost to the student-athletes than the benefits they
would receive under a professional model." 8 The proponents of revenue sharing seem to
disregard the economic value of a college education and the potential for income over the
lifetime of the student-athletes, which can be in excess of $500,000 and surpasses the amounts of
potential income of the revenue sharing model."19
B. Perpetuation ofStereotypes and Stigmas
Stigmas exist on college campuses that student-athletes are "dumb jocks" or are given
preferential treatment as compared to other students. A division already exists between the
mainstream students and student-athletes, a division that will become greater if student-athletes
are given monetary compensation for playing sports. Student-athletes are most likely to feel
"isolated from the institution's academic and social mainstream." 120  The emphasis in the
revenue sharing system away from education will intensify these stigmas and feelings of
isolation that student-athletes currently experience.121
Allowing a system based on a professional model may also increase or create tensions
between the student-athletes themselves. Professional athletes are often paid more or less
116 Rodney K. Smith and Robert D. Walker, From Inequity to Opportunity: Keeping the Promises Made to Big-Time
Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 1 NEV. L.J. 160, 173 (2001).
117 Id. at 173.
118 Id.
119
12 0 Id. at 173-174.
121 Id. at 174.
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depending on their position, current popularity and/or performance level. Incorporating a
professional model of revenue sharing in college athletics will be harmful to player relationships.
The aspect of the revenue sharing proposal that allows for post-season compensation based on
post-season performance will potentially create animosity between players on the same teams.
Also, players who may receive more compensation based on higher post-season performances,
can become even further isolated from the mainstream of their respective educational
institutions.
C. Creating an Employer-Employee Relationship
Another criticism of paying student-athletes is that workers' compensation laws would
govern college sports. A system of "pay for play" creates an employment type relationship
between the students and the universities. 122  This would create incredible costs for the
universities as they would become responsible for the costs of players' injuries.123 Courts have
in the past rejected awarding workers' compensation benefits to student-athletes based on
compensation in the form of athletic scholarships for various reasons, such as lack of intent to
create an employer-employee relationship, policies considering amateurism and education main
priorities124 and also by applying an economic reality test.125 By paying athletes for their
performances on the field thrusts them into the position of university employees, thereby making
them eligible for workers' compensation benefits.126 With the great risk of injury in some
college sports, especially high revenue generating sports like Division I football, the schools
122 Hurst, supra note 90.
123 id..
124 See Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
125 See Coleman v. Western Michigan University, 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), where the court
considered the university's right to control a scholarship athlete, the right to discipline him and the lack of payment
of wages.
126 Hurst, supra note 90.
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could potentially be paying big money for extensive medical procedures or loss of future earning
power in the case of serious injuries. 27
Also along with placing student-athletes in the position of university employees, comes
the governance of labor laws. Currently, student-athletes do not qualify as employees under the
National Labor Relations Act, but paying them for their athletic performances would qualify
them under this act, and thereby giving them the ability to establish unions and bargain
collectively.128 Any disagreement with regard to frequency of practice, amount of payments, or
even credits required to graduate, would give the student-athletes the option to strike against the
-- 129
universities.
The creation of an employment relationship may also bring to light the issue of whether
to performances of the student-athletes are to be considered a work-for-hire as under the 1976
Copyright Act.130 If a student-athlete is receiving compensation in exchange for using his
persona, then an issue may arise with regard to any existing copyrights, such as a copyright in
the telecasts of the sporting events. A student-athlete may still not be able to control his or her
rights of publicity if a game is broadcast without his or her consent.
Take for example the case of Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players'
Association.131 The case of Baltimore Orioles, involved a clash between the Major League
Baseball Clubs ("Clubs") and the Major League Baseball Players Association ("Players"). The




A work for hire is defined in part in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment."
"' 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
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making telecasts without the Players' consent.132 The Clubs filed an action to obtain a
declaratory judgment that the Clubs owned both the exclusive rights to broadcast the games and
the exclusive rights to the telecasts.133 The District Court found that the Clubs owned the
copyright in the telecasts as works made for hire and that the Clubs' copyright in the telecasts
preempted the Players' rights of publicity in their performances.134  The Seventh Circuit
addressed the case, and undertook a work for hire analysis and preemption analysis of the facts.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the decision of the District Court that the telecasts were works
made for hire, and determined that the Clubs owned the copyright to the telecasts and all rights
encompassed in the copyright.135 The Players' right of publicity claims were also dismissed as it
was determined that they were preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright Act. In deciding so,
the Court also noted that the Players' might have had an opportunity to negotiate for these rights
when bargaining the terms of their contracts.136 Student-athletes could continue to have their
rights of publicity infringed, as their performances would most likely be considered works for
hire, resulting in a preemption of any publicity claims by the Federal Copyright Act.
D. Title IX Implications
Opponents of compensating student-athletes argue that doing so will create violations of
Title IX. The purpose of Title IX "is to combat gender discrimination in educational programs
and activities receiving federal funding."1 37 Currently, the monies received from those sports
generating the highest revenues are distributed to other athletic programs that do not produce
such revenues. A concern exists with programs, such as revenue sharing, that money would be
132 Id. at 665.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 666.
'3 Id. at 672.
36 Id. at 679.
Acain, supra note 48, at 345.
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taken away from the athletic department, so as to give it to the student-athletes, thereby taking it
away from other programs that currently benefit from this money.138 The Title IX violations
arise because many athletic programs that do not produce revenues and benefit from the revenues
generated by other programs are women's teams. 139 To avoid violating Title IX, universities
would then have to also compensate a proportionate number of female athletes to male athletes
receiving compensation.140 Title IX not only requires universities to provide equal opportunities
for participation in athletic programs, it also requires the schools to provide equal treatment and
benefits for all student-athletes.141 To provide equal treatment and benefits to all student-
athletes, male and female, universities would be required to compensate all athletic programs the
same. Some may argue that Title IX compliance does not require equal access to revenue
generated by men's sports, but rather means, simply, an equal opportunity to generate
revenues.142 Coming back to the fact that women's sports rarely generate revenues, though, it
seems unlikely that the women's programs have the same opportunity to generate revenues.143
Having to disburse revenues to several student-athletes, men and women both, would be
incredibly costly for universities and it seems unlikely that the institutions would be willing to do
this, or would even be able to financially comply with Title IX.
Other concerns arise with the potentiality of Title IX violations. Rather than to be found
violating Title IX, universities may cut non-revenue producing men's sports to create funds for
138 Acain, supra note 48, at 347.
139 Acain, supra note 48, at 347.
140 Hurst, supra note 90.
141 Hurst, supra note 90.
142 Id.. See Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987), in which the Washington Supreme Court
construed equal opportunity to mean an equal opportunity to raise revenues rather than an equal access to another
sport's profits.
143 Hurst, supra note 90.
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women's teams. 144 This may have already occurred on many campuses due to the execution of
Title IX, and implementing a compensation program would simply exacerbate this problem. The
reverse inequities of what triggered Title IX could then occur. A question arises as to whether
the non-revenue generating men's programs are being treated equally and receiving the same
benefits as non-revenue generating men's programs.
One of the biggest hurdles to implementing a program compensating athletes for the
revenues they are generating is that most schools really cannot afford to do this. The estimated
cost of compensating student-athletes generating revenues, as well as providing payment to a
proportionate number of female students is $30 million per year.145 Some schools do generate
the revenue to cover these costs, but many do not. Many athletic departments generally operate
at a loss, especially since the implementation of Title IX.146 There have been suggestions for
creating additional revenues, which include increasing student activity fees, increasing tuition
and ticket prices, soliciting corporate sponsorship, creating a national football championship
playoff, reducing available football scholarships, and requesting professional leagues, such as the
NFL, NBA and WNBA to provide support of collegiate athletics, as they are in essence, the
minor leagues to these professional leagues.147 It seems unlikely that many of these suggestions
would be favored. Increasing tuition and fees may restrict students that do not receive athletic
scholarships from being able to attend universities, and reducing athletic scholarships may
prevent student-athletes who could not otherwise afford college from attending. Soliciting
144 Acain, supra note 48, at 349.
145 Hurst, supra note 90.
146 Hurst, supra note 90.
147 Hurst, supra note 90.
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corporate benefactors and the professional leagues to provide support would in effect create
more costs as additional personnel would be needed to do the soliciting.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It seems that compensation of student-athletes for their athletic performances may not
necessarily be the perfect answer to protecting their rights of publicity. The question remains
whether student-athletes should be allowed to exercise their rights of publicity. Is the right of
publicity something that should be assignable? Presently, a person can assign his or her publicity
rights to another. An argument can be made that student-athletes, by accepting an athletic
scholarship in exchange for a chance to participate in college athletics, have assigned their rights
of publicity to the universities. They turn over any control they have to control the commercial
use of their personas and likenesses to the institutions they agree to play for.
The problem seems to lie, not in the fact that student-athletes do not receive
compensation for the use of their personas, identities, and likenesses, but rather, the focus of
college sports has become very commercialized, and student-athletes are losing focus on what
they are really there for: an education. Student-athletes see the fame and fortune that is being
generated by their efforts, and understandably want a piece of the action. When a head coach is
making six figures or more per year, it is difficult to maintain the focus on the student-athletes'
education. For example, the head football coach of Louisiana State University (LSU) recently
signed a seven-year contract granting him $2.3 million this year and increasing by $100,000 each
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year thereafter.148 The contract provides that a portion of his salary comes from shoe and
equipment contracts and other deals.149  His previous contract of $1.6 million included a
"stipulation that required him to make at least $1 more than the highest-paid college coach in the
country if LSU won the national championship." 50 Contracts such as this make it very obvious
to see that a coach may do whatever is necessary to win, and do so at all costs, especially at the
expense of the student-athletes' education. These contracts also help explain why student-
athletes are so anxious to get paid for their efforts. They see their coaches getting paid from shoe
and equipment contracts, when they are disallowed from doing so. These companies providing
money to the universities and coaches are essentially paying for the student-athlete to wear their
merchandise and make it popular. It is easy to see why student-athletes have a problem with
this, as they are putting in all the effort, time, and risk of injury, and their coaches and schools
are reaping all the rewards.
How do we take the commercialism out of college athletics and put amateurism and
academics back in? The answer is not an easy, and maybe not even a possible one. Merchandise
sales will continue, video games will continue to be produced, and television contracts will
continue to be made. One suggestion in response to the exploitation that occurs with jersey sales
is to limit merchandise sales to t-shirts with just the institution's name or jerseys without specific
numbers. Video games could include players that appear more ambiguous and do not resemble
any specific player or playing style. Addressing the exploitation of television contracts seems
more difficult as it is unlikely that game broadcasts would be removed from television. It seems
148 Associated Press, Contract starts at $2.3M a year, Feb. 19, 2004, available at




that it may be too late to change the commercialism that is overwhelmingly present in college
sports. It may not be too late, though, to bring the emphasis back on education. The focus needs
to be turned back to the fact that college athletes are actually in college to get an education that
will create productive members of society, on and off the field.
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